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J. Gorynski (Poland), Under Secretary, Ministry of Communal Administration and Housing.
Eiichi Isomura (Japan), professor of sociology, Tokyo University.
Barbara Ward Jackson (Britain), economist and author.
Sture Linner (U.N.), Director of United Nations Special Fund programs in Greece, representative of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board.
M. S. Makiya (Iraq), principal, Department of Architecture, University of Baghdad.
Edward S. Mason (United States), Lamont University professor, Harvard University.
Sir Robert Matthew (Britain), president, Royal Institute of British Architects.
Margaret Mead (United States), president, American Anthropological Association; associate curator of ethnology, American Museum of Natural History, New York.
Marshall McLuhan (Canada), director, Center for the Study of the Extension of Man, University of Toronto.
Waclaw Ostrowski (Poland), professor of town planning, Technical University, Warsaw.
Alfred R. Otoo (Ghana), chief development officer, Accra-Tema metropolitan area.
David Owen (U.N.), Executive Chairman, Technical Assistance Board of the United Nations.
Charles H. Page (United States), professor of sociology, Princeton University.
E. Papanoutsos (Greece), vice president, Athens Technological Institute.
Shafik H. El-Sadr (United Arab Republic), Under Secretary of State for the Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities.
Carl Schwyer (Germany), President, International Federation of Housing and Planning.
C. H. Waddington (Britain), professor of animal genetics, University of Edinburgh.
Sir Robert Watson Watt (Britain), Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, Calif.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the current issue of the Saturday Evening Post contains an excellent and thought provoking article entitled "The CIA Is Getting Out of Hand," by the distinguished junior Senator from Minnesota [Mr. McCARTHY].

This is a subject that has long interested me, both as a Senator and in my previous work as a Foreign Service officer and with refugees from behind the Iron Curtain. In fact, I was a cosponsor of Senator McCARTHY's resolution in the 87th Congress calling for the establishment of a joint committee concerned with this subject.

Senator McCARTHY's article is explicit, lucid, and speaks for itself. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE CIA IS GETTING OUT OF HAND (By Senator EUGENE McCARTHY)

Wrapped in its cloak of secrecy, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency modestly hints it has overthrown foreign governments, admits that it violates international law and does not deny that one of its exploits wrecked a summit conference. The CIA, in short, is making foreign policy and, in so doing, is assuming the roles of the President

and the Congress. It has taken on the character of an invisible government answering only to itself. This must stop. The CIA must be made accountable for its activities, not only to the President but also to Congress through a responsible committee.

Recent events in South Vietnam raise questions as to how CIA actions may critically affect U.S. foreign affairs. In early September it was reported that the CIA was giving money—some \$3 million a year in "direct, under-the-table aid"—to the Diem regime's special corps that raided Buddhist pagodas in Saigon. The CIA payments were made even though the U.S. Government publicly deplored the raids, part of the repression of the Buddhists which helped bring about the downfall of the Diem regime.

In Laos, too, the CIA pursued policies that conflicted with official and public policies of the State Department. In 1958 a highly volatile Laos was governed by a loose coalition headed by neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma. The situation was hardly ideal, but to Ambassador Horace Smith and the U.S. State Department this coalition government seemed to offer the best hope for a stable Laos. According to Smith, the CIA, with the backing of the Pentagon, threw its support behind right-wing leader Gen. Phoumi Nosavan. In August 1960 Souvanna Phouma was overthrown, and Phoumi Nosavan installed Prince Boun Oum, an ineffectual leader, as titular head of the government. The Communists then sought to take over the country. Gen. Phoumi Nosavan's troops proved unwilling to fight. All of Laos appeared on the verge of going Communist. Frantic diplomatic maneuvers restored a coalition government under neutralist Souvanna Phouma in June 1962, but in the meantime millions of dollars of U.S. aid had been wasted and vast confusion spread about U.S. aims in Laos.

Ambassador Smith is not the only member of the U.S. diplomatic corps to complain about CIA spooks who flit through U.S. embassies while pursuing their own brand of foreign policy. Nor is Laos the only country where the CIA has helped engineer a coup. In 1953 the government of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran fell because of CIA efforts, says the CIA. Who, if anyone, authorized the agency to overthrow Mossadegh is unknown. Actually, many authorities dispute the CIA's role in the Iranian coup, but since the Agency hides behind its cloak of secrecy, its claims cannot be effectively challenged.

The CIA also claims to have masterminded the overthrow of the Communist-influenced government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala in 1954. In this instance the result undoubtedly benefited the United States, but the question remains as to whether the CIA is the proper tool for such endeavors.

Possibly the mightiest achievement of the CIA was the development of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. Surveillance through the U-2 has provided U.S. intelligence with an enormous amount of useful information, and the CIA deserves a great deal of credit for the development of the U-2 as an information tool. But the CIA's usage of the U-2 is something else again. Shortly before a summit conference between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev in 1960, a U-2 was shot down 1,200 miles inside Soviet territory. At first we denied any plane was missing; then an official statement said a weather plane must have strayed off course; and finally we admitted aerial surveillance and justified it as necessary to defend our country. Apparently nobody in the CIA ever fully evaluated the consequences of a U-2 failure over Soviet soil. We had no cover story, and our President arrived at the Paris summit conference with the CIA's egg all over his face.

The U-2 failure over Sverdlovsk involved far more than a daring gamble to obtain intelligence. Because the flight was scheduled

on the eve of the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit meeting, the CIA mission became an uncalculated risk jeopardizing the immediate foreign policy of the United States and trespassing upon the prerogatives of the White House, the State Department and the Congress. The CIA in effect made foreign policy, and we in Congress who are charged with advice and consent for foreign affairs stood by helplessly because we knew nothing of the U-2 activities.

Again, the CIA overplayed its legitimate role in the Bay of Pigs invasion. Those who condemn the CIA for the tactical failures of this fiasco blame the agency for the wrong errors. Its first mistake was to assume the authority to raise an army on U.S. soil, even though the troops were Cuban refugees, without both presidential and congressional approval. The responsibility for organizing and sustaining Armed Forces lies with Congress, not a supersecret intelligence agency. Second, the CIA was engaged in an invasion which might possibly be construed as an act of war; only Congress has the right to declare war. Because the CIA operates in the way it does, very few of us in Congress had advance knowledge of the invasion plans or were consulted as to the wisdom of such an adventure.

When Congress created the CIA in 1947, it gave the Agency no power to make foreign policy. The purpose of the CIA was to centralize the collection and evaluation of intelligence. Less than 20 years later—with 14,000 employees, including specialists in intelligence analysis and espionage, U-2 pilots and assassins—the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is rated one of the half dozen most powerful men in Washington. And as Stewart Alsop reported, "CIA, the Battle for Secret Power," the Saturday Evening Post, July 27-August 3, 1963, "The CIA spends a lot more money than the State Department, and at times it has had more real power and influence on high policy."

Defenders of the activities of the CIA say we can no longer afford the luxury of foreign policy conducted according to the rules of the U.S. Constitution. Under the Constitution, Congress has the power to declare war and the responsibility to give advice and consent to the President in making treaties with foreign nations. Congress is also the source of all foreign-policy legislation, including all appropriations for foreign affairs.

The authors of the Constitution, admittedly, lived in a different era. The cold war, with its highly developed tactics of espionage, counterespionage, and subversion, presents problems which go far beyond the imaginings of the men who wrote the Constitution. A new clandestine organization devoted to the gathering and evaluating of intelligence must impinge somewhat upon the functions of some of the traditional agencies.

This information center, however, has no business taking over the roles of the State Department, Defense Department, and Congress, as well as carrying the Nation to the edge of war. In any event, if we must revise the functions of the recognized Government agencies, then let us do it through proper legislative channels, not by covert acts of the CIA.

In theory the President, with the help of his Cabinet and the National Security Council, controls and directs the CIA. But the President is the nominal head of hundreds of agencies and cannot be kept fully informed at all times of the activities of an agency as large and as powerful as the CIA. Even if the CIA were fully under Presidential control, the basic question of the right and duty of Congress to participate in decisions regarding the many Central Intelligence Agency activities would remain unanswered. The issue is not one of Executive control or of efficient administration of the CIA. It is the fundamental question of congressional responsibility. Do or do

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